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CONFIDENTIAL020665  
2 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT

: Interdepartmental Coordination Conference  
for Directors of Training, 24-27 May 1965

W/O ATT

1. The Second Interdepartmental Coordination Conference for Directors of Training was held from 24-27 May 1965 and was attended by a contingent of Agency representatives, all from the Office of Training. While the Conference may not have any impact on the Government immediately, it is likely that we will see a change in the Government's outlook on insurgency. It may take the form of a slow, silent death of "counter" and a growing acceptance of the need to "capture" the leadership (radical as it may be) of the wars for liberation. It was apparent, and admitted by Charles Maechling, a special assistant to Ambassador Harriman, that the basic document under review during this conference, the Overseas Internal Defense Policy (OIDP) paper, was the inspiration and creation of the Kennedy administration, and that it is now nothing more than a "training and not a policy paper". While the fact, that an Assistant Secretary of Defense and two Ambassadors did not even know what the OIDE was, did not shake the conferees unduly, there was concern over the appropriateness of the concept of counterinsurgency as it has been understood.

2. I sensed a forming consensus that "Counterinsurgency" is an outdated word, verging perhaps on becoming a bad word. It was identified as a negative word, being counter, and a poor phrase

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because we are not against all insurgency; in fact, some insurgency is good. It is the subversive or Communist-inspired force that must be met and the "U.S. must discriminate" between situations as "it is not the world's universal fireman".

3. The seemingly obvious implication to CIA is to continue our concentration on the basic mission of detecting subversion through the penetration of indicated targets, coupled with an assist to those forces which need technical and paramilitary know-how to stop the enemy while there is time to use the limited effect of clandestine methods.

4. I was struck with what I have come to judge to be a significant communications breakdown between the highest decision-making level of the U.S. Government and this working group element. Equally serious was the noted, and commented upon, poor communications between the echelon represented by these conferees and the younger officers and enlisted men in the field. The question was asked more than once, who tells the U.S. soldier that has the NBC microphone stuck under his nose what side he is on and what to say.

5. I am attaching herewith a folder containing the basic documents issued at the Conference, including a copy of the report of Working Group I, Team 1, chaired by Ambassador McClintock.

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Attachment as stated

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DC/PMT

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